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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s highly interconnected world, global supply chain networks (SCNs) play a vital role in fuelling 
international trade and economic growth. Due to the interconnectedness of global businesses, which are 
no longer isolated by industry or geography, any disruptions to supply chains, such as natural disasters, 
acts of war and terrorism, and even labour disputes are becoming increasingly complex in nature and 
global in consequences (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). These disruptions can ripple through global supply 
chains, magnifying the original damage. Even relatively minor disturbances, such as labour disputes, 
ground congestion or air traffic delays can result in disproportionately severe disruptions to local and 
international trade. Therefore, this ‘fragility of interdependence’ creates unprecedented risks to global 
and local economies (Vespignani, 2010). 
At the local level, disturbances to supply chains can have major social and economic ramifications. For 
instance, during the 2011 Queensland floods in Australia, the key transportation routes were shut down, 
preventing supermarkets from restocking and leading to critical food shortages (Bartos, 2012). However, 
at the global level, these consequences are typically magnified, resulting in more and longer lasting 
damage. A recent example of a global supply chain disruption is the 2011 offshore earthquake, which 
subsequently manifested itself as a tsunami, which hit the northeast coast of Japan. Alongside the 
appalling humanitarian impact, this tsunami caused destruction of critical infrastructure, which 
propagated through global supply chains and transportation networks, with significant global economic 
consequences (Canis, 2011). Another example of such a high impact-low probability disruption to 
supply chains is the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, which resulted in disruptions 
to the movement of automotive parts due to the shutdown of air and truck transportation networks 
(Sheffi, 2001). Such disasters affect a large number of economic variables, such as industrial production, 
international trade, and logistics operations, and on occasion revealing hitherto hidden vulnerabilities 
in global supply chains (Tett, 2011). 
In addition to these disastrous events, supply chains must also continue to operate through unexpected 
changes in supply and demand. In 2001, Cisco suffered a loss of 2.2 billion dollars due to a sudden 
decline in demand for their products, which resulted in the accumulation of a large inventory stockpile 
(Supply Chain Digest, 2006). Therefore, the design of supply chains that can maintain their function in 
the face of perturbations, both expected and unexpected, is a key goal of supply chain management. 
Up until the turn of the millennium, the primary focus of supply chain management was on increasing 
efficiency by means of globalization, specialisation and lean supply chain practice. Although, these 
practices enable cost savings in daily operations, they have also made the supply networks more 
vulnerable to disruptions (World Economic Forum, 2013). Under a low probability-high impact 
disruption, lean supply chains shut down in a matter of hours, with global implications. Supply 
concentration and IT reliance make the supply chains vulnerable to targeted attacks, where critical nodes 
are impacted. This is particularly evident in the supply systems with low levels of ‘buffer’ inventory, 
which result in rapid impacts under interruptions in supply relative to the demand (Cranfield University, 
2002).   
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World Economic Forum (2013) presented Accenture’s expert group research findings on how the recent 
trends in supply chain management practices have shifted risk distributions. Table 1 summarises these 
effects.  
 
Table 1: Trends in Supply Chain Management Practices (adapted from World Economic Forum, 2013) 
Trend Example Risk Impact 
Globalization Outsourcing, offshoring Locally concentrated risks propagate globally, involving multiple 
actors 
Specialization Geographical concentration 
of production 
Global production can be disrupted by a local event 
Complexity Product/network complexity Reliance on multiple parts/players in diverse locations reduces 
visibility and adds latency into monitoring systems 
Lean processes Single sourcing, buffer stock 
reduction 
While initially efficiency is improved and costs are lowered, there 
are fewer alternatives in the case of disruption 
Information 
availability 
Track and trace Systems increasingly reliant on information flow 
Government 
legislation 
Air cargo screening Measures can impede the efficient flow of the supply chain and 
transport networks 
 
It is evident that both practitioners and scholars in the field increasingly recognise the importance of 
building resilience into supply chains. A recent trend of publications, by both academic and industry 
communities, reveals the importance of the concept of resilience in global supply chains. Researchers 
in the field have acknowledged the increasing complexity of supply chains and have started 
investigating and modelling what were traditionally viewed as linear supply systems as ‘complex 
systems’ (Wycisk et al., 2008). Recently, increasing focus is given to the modelling of supply networks 
as ‘complex adaptive systems’, in order to examine the resilience characteristics offered by various 
complex network topologies (Choi et al, 2001; Surana et al., 2005).  
The aim of this paper is to present a comprehensive review of the published research, mainly in the last 
decade, in fields related to the modelling of supply chain resilience as complex adaptive networks.  
Clarification of various ideas relating to supply chain resilience is provided and the approaches used by 
various researchers to model and understand the concept of supply chain resilience, using complex 
adaptive systems perspective, is discussed. Ultimately, this review paper aims to establish a stepping 
stone for the development of a comprehensive conceptual framework for assessing supply chain 
resilience using complex adaptive network modelling techniques.  
 
The paper is structured as follows; Section 2 outlines published findings on the concept of supply chain 
resilience; Section 3 presents a discussion, including comparisons and critiques, of the reviewed 
research; Section 4 outlines the possible directions for future research, building on the research 
published thus far; Section 5 provides a conclusion of this review; while Sections 6 and 7 include 
acknowledgements and references, respectively.  
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2. Literature review 
 
This section first investigates the concept of supply chain resilience, in the light of various definitions 
provided within the contemporary literature. Subsequently, the research work undertaken in the area of 
supply chain resilience modelling, particularly from a complex systems topology perspective, is 
discussed in more detail.   
 
2.1  THE CONCEPT OF SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE 
 
Surana et al. (2005, pp. 4235) define the function of a supply chain as to ‘transfer information, products 
and finance amongst suppliers of raw materials, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and consumers’. 
Therefore, an efficient supply chain permits the goods to be produced and delivered in the right amounts, 
at the right time, to the right locations efficiently and reliably (Christopher and Peck, 2004). In line with 
the above, a resilient supply chain should respond quickly and effectively to a given perturbation such 
as a change in supply or demand, or to the failure of an individual component within the overall system 
due to manmade (war and terrorist attacks) or natural (hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, etc) 
disasters.  
 
Up until the turn of 21st century, the key focus of supply chain management was to create efficient 
supply chains with high speed/low cost production and delivery. As a result, many companies have 
adopted centralised manufacturing and distribution facilities to take advantage of economies of scale 
arising from such systems. However, when demand for a particular product fluctuates unexpectedly, 
these companies are unable to respond in time (Lee, 2004).  
 
In light of the experience from 9/11 terrorist attacks, and other manmade and natural disasters which 
occurred within the last 10 to 15 years, the globalised supply chain operators have realised the 
importance of building resilient supply chains to withstand high impact-low probability disruptions. 
Therefore, the focus has recently been shifted from supply chain efficiency to supply chain agility (more 
broadly defined as supply chain resilience).  
 
The lack of historical data on the effects on supply chain operations from these high impact-low 
probability events has made it difficult to develop a common resilience framework for SCNs. Therefore, 
most researchers rely on simulation models to understand this phenomenon. Alternatively, the 
researchers can extrapolate the effects low impact-high probability disruptions to supply chains, for 
which they have the benefit of hindsight, in order to estimate the impacts of high impact-low probability 
events (McFarlane and Sheffi, 2003). 
 
The concept of resilience goes in parallel with the concept of disruption as identified by the researchers 
in a given context. A review of contemporary literature indicates presence of ambiguity and confusion 
in how the terms ‘resilience’ and ‘disruption’ are defined within the context of supply chains. Table 2 
summarises the attempts by researchers, within the field of supply chain research, to define the concepts 
of ‘resilience’ and ‘disruption’. 
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Table 2: Concepts of ‘resilience’ and ‘disruptions’ as defined by various researchers 
Reference Definition of Disruption Definition of Resilience 
Kim et al. 
(2015) 
Supply network disruption is defined as a 
situation where there no longer exists a 
walk between the source(s) and sink nodes 
as a consequence of a disruption(s) in 
nodes or arcs, i.e.: the supply network 
becomes disconnected.  
Supply network resilience = The total number of node or 
arc disruptions, which does not result in a supply network 
disruption, divided by the total number of node or arc 
disruptions. 
Levalle and 
Nof (2014) No formal definition provided 
Flow from one agent to another must comply with a 
service level agreement - i.e. A set of pre-arranged, 
mutually agreed terms of service that describe the 
required characteristics of the supplied flow. The level of 
compliance to these pre-arranged conditions is defined as 
the quality of service (QOS). Resilience is defined as the 
inherent ability of a supply network agent to (1) anticipate 
errors and conflicts, (2) prevent them from creating 
disruptions to normal operation and (3) overcome 
disruptions with minimum QoS loss, within sustainable 
use of resources. 
Rajesh and 
Ravi (2014) No formal definition provided. 
Definition of resilience is borrowed from Christopher and 
Peck (2004). Resilient suppliers are defined as, 'suppliers 
who are able to provide good quality products at economy 
rates and flexible enough to accommodate demand 
fluctuations with shorter lead times over a lower 
ambience of risk without compromising on safety and 
environment practices'. 
Soni et al. 
(2014) 
The definition of supply chain disruptions 
is borrowed from Svensson (2001): 
‘‘unplanned events that may occur in the 
supply chain which might affect the normal 
or expected flow of materials and 
components’’  
Supply chain resilience focuses on the system's adaptive 
capability to deal with temporary disruptive events. In this 
paper, the authors consider these capabilities as 
"enablers" that facilitate the attainment of resilience in 
supply chain. 
Bartos (2012) No formal definition provided 
Resilience is defined as the capacity of organisations or 
systems to return to full functionality in the face of 
disruption. The characteristics of a resilient logistics 
network or supply chain are commonly identified in terms 
of redundancy and flexibility, to which should be added 
the dimension of concentration (a more concentrated 
network is less resilient than a dispersed one). 
Zhao et al. 
(2011a) 
Disruptions are identified as loss of some 
structures or functions; i.e.: node and/or 
link removal within the SCN. 
Resilience is defined as the ability of the supply chain to 
maintain operations and connectedness under the loss of 
some structures or functions (this is simulated by removal 
of nodes). 
Zhao et al. 
(2011b) 
Disruptions are identified as loss of some 
structures or functions; i.e.: node and/or 
link removal within the SCN. 
Robustness and resilience are used interchangeably. The 
authors do not distinguish between them. Subsequently, 
robustness is defined as the ability of a network to 
maintain operations and connectedness when some 
structures or functions are lost. 
Klibi et al. 
(2010) No formal definition provided. 
Resilience is defined as the capability of a SCN to avoid 
disruptions or quickly recover from failures. 
Ponomarov and 
Holcomb 
(2009) 
A formal definition of disruption has not 
been provided. Sources of disruptions are 
discussed.  
Resilience is defined as the adaptive capability of the 
supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, respond to 
disruptions, and recover from them by maintaining 
continuity of operations at the desired level of 
connectedness and control over structure and function. 
Wang and Ip 
(2009) No formal definition provided. 
Resilience is understood as the ability of a system to 
return to a stable state following strong perturbation from 
failure or attack. The recover ability may include the 
failure prediction and identification abilities, quickly 
repair or replace abilities, and resource reorganizing or 
emergent supply abilities. 
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Falasca et al. 
(2008) No formal definition provided. 
Supply chain resilience is defined as the ability of a 
supply chain system to reduce the probabilities of a 
disruption, to reduce the consequences of those 
disruptions once they occur, and to reduce the time to 
recover normal performance. The above definition is 
provided in the context of resilience triangle as per 
Tierney and Bruneau (2007). 
Hu et al. (2008) 
Disruption, at its primary form, is defined 
as a loss of capacity. This can be viewed as 
removal or reduced capacity of one or more 
nodes (either transformation or 
transportation).  
Resilience is defined as the ability of an enterprise to 
withstand potentially high disruptive events.  
Datta et al. 
(2007) No formal definition provided. 
Resilience is defined as the ‘performance of an actual 
production/distribution system under uncertain demand’ 
Sheffi and Rice 
(2005) 
The term ‘disruption’ has not been formally 
defined. However, a typical 'disruption' is 
characterised by 8 distinct stages - (1) 
preparation, (2) the disruptive event, (3) 
first response, (4) initial impact, (5) full 
impact, (6) recovery preparations, (7) 
recovery and (8) long term impact.  
Resilience is defined as the ability to bounce back from a 
disruption. Resilience can be improved by either creating 
redundancy or by increasing flexibility.  
Christopher 
and Peck 
(2004) 
Disruption is considered as an exposure to 
serious disturbance. 
Resilience is defined as the ability of a system to return to 
its original state or move to a new, more desirable state 
after being disturbed (flexibility and adaptability aspects 
are built into this definition). 
Dalziell and 
McManus 
(2004) 
No formal definition provided. 
Authors propose using the term 'resilience' to describe the 
overarching goal of a system to continue to function to the 
fullest possible extent in the face of a stress to achieve its 
purpose, where resilience is a function of both the 
vulnerability and of the adaptive capacity of the system.  
 
From the summary presented in Table 2, it is evident that no clear consensus exists among the 
researchers on the exact definition of the term ‘resilience’. Some researchers define resilience as an 
inherent property/ability within the supply network (Levalle and Nof, 2014) while the others identify it 
as a goal for the overall system (Dalziell and McManus, 2004). Some describe resilience as both an 
inherent property and a dynamic capability of the overall system (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Falasca 
et al., 2008; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009; Klibi et al., 2010).  
 
Sheffi and Rice (2005) stipulate that through creating redundancy or by increasing flexibility, the 
overall system resilience can be improved. However, this assertion is challenged by Kim et al. (2015) 
who illustrate through their simulation results that denser networks do not necessarily have higher 
resilience. As per the above, the resilience measurement is indeed dependent on the analysis perspective 
and the resilience metrics utilised by each researcher. 
 
Although most researchers define the term ‘resilience’ in unique ways, only a few have attempted to 
link this concept with a formal definition of ‘disruption’ within the context of supply chain operations. 
However, from the context of these researchers, it can be assumed that the term ‘disruption’ is used to 
describe a significant unforeseen variation to business as usual operations. Therefore, it is important to 
recognise ‘business as usual operations’ within the context of supply chain operations since any 
business will likely have variations to their operations on a daily basis. The key distinction to be made 
here is that the term ‘disruption’ should refer to unforeseen events in the system that have adverse 
impacts on the overall capacity instead of regular perturbations such as expected daily fluctuations in 
capacity.  
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As “you can’t manage what you don’t measure”, it is important to establish the term ‘disruption’ as a 
measurable variable, in order to effectively control and mitigate the unfavourable effects arising from 
such disruptions. This is particularly relevant in scenarios where post disruption supply network 
rewiring is sought – at which stage the rewiring costs (costs associated with establishing new 
relationships/contracts) must be compared against the costs arising from loss of service due to the 
disruption.  
 
Kim et al. (2015) illustrate the importance of identifying each disruption at the level at which it occurs 
and the scope of its effect, by providing an example involving Toyota, which experienced a disruption 
at a component plant in Japan (a cause at node level), which subsequently led to a shutdown in Toyota’s 
North American truck production (the effect at the supply network level). 
 
Therefore, the term ‘disruption’ should be defined, at an organisational level, as an event, which 
contributes to the loss of capacity of the supply network, below a pre-set threshold service to capacity 
ratio (depending on the organisation). Furthermore, it is important to establish the location (node or a 
link) and scope (spread) of this disruption. 
 
The general definition derived above, in principle, is in agreement with the definition of a disruption as 
identified by Hu et al. (2008) and Levalle and Nof (2014). Using the above definition, each organisation 
can establish the costs due to a particular disruption, thus enabling the management to make informed 
decisions on the various trade-offs involved among respective options.  
 
Longstaff et al. (2010) define resilience in the context of ‘communities’. This definition presents 
resilience as a function of robustness and adaptive capacity (see Figure 1 below). As can be seen from 
the figure, the Y-axis of the graph represents the ‘robustness’ of the system – which essentially reflects 
how difficult it is to disrupt the overall system (i.e. the difficulty of pushing the system below the normal 
operational capacity by a set threshold). The X-axis of the graph indicates the ‘adaptive capacity’ of the 
system, which represents how quickly the system can ‘bounce back’ to its normal operations once a 
disruption has occurred. The resilience of the system is therefore the area under the graph.  
 
Hypothetically, from the above definition, two separate systems could have an equal amount of 
resilience, but a different mix of robustness and adaptive capacity. Moreover, the relationship between 
the robustness and the adaptive capacity, as indicated below, suggests that they are inversely related to 
each other – i.e. increasing the system robustness will reduce its adaptive capacity and vice versa.  
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Figure 1: Concept of ‘resilience’ defined as a function of robustness and adaptive capacity (Longstaff et al., 
2010) 
 
2.2 COMPLEX SYSTEMS MODELLING OF SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE 
Most research work, in the area of supply chain resilience, has focussed on qualitative strategies that 
could be adopted at each level within a supply chain to minimise the adverse impacts of disruptions 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004; Christopher and Rutherford, 2004; Dalziell and McManus, 2004; Jüttner, 
2005; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Craighead et al., 2007). 
 
In addition to the above, quantitative work involving the simulation of supply chains is developed by a 
number of researchers. Traditionally, the supply networks are modelled as multi-agent systems, in order 
to represent explicit communications between various entities involved (Thadakamaila et al., 2004). 
However, a recent research trend has focussed on modelling supply networks as complex adaptive 
systems. Such an approach has enabled the researchers to investigate various topological properties of 
different networks which give rise to resilience characteristics in a given supply network.  
 
Moreover, recent advances in network theory have further encouraged the researchers to adopt a 
complex network perspective in modelling supply chain operations. This is evident in the work 
published by: Thadakamaila et al., 2004; Nair and Vidal, 2011; Zhao et al., 2011(a); Zhao et al., 2011(b) 
and Kim et al., 2015. Complex network perspective can be adopted to assess the supply chain operations, 
if the level of analysis considers the overall supply network level.  
Owing to the advancements in information technology and globalization in the 21st Century, supply 
chains which once resembled linear flows of goods from manufacturers to customers, have now evolved 
into dynamic and complex supply networks comprising various interacting entities. A supply network 
consists of nodes, which represent spatially stable entities (such as manufacturer, distributers, 
warehouses and retailers), and links, which represent dynamic interactions between nodes (such as 
transportation, communication and logistic routes between two or more nodes).  
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Broadly classified, the complex network modelling of SCNs has mainly focussed on the following 
network topologies for benchmarking purposes; 
1) Random graphs (Erdȍs and Rényi, 1959): where vertices are randomly connected to each other. 
2) Small-world networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998): most nodes of such a network are not 
neighbours of one another, but most nodes can be reached from every other node by a small 
number of steps.  
3) Scale-free (Barabási and Albert, 1999): degree distribution follows a power law, at least 
asymptotically. 
 
The key characteristics of the above network topologies are presented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Comparison of random, small-world and scale free networks (Thadakamalia et 
al., 2004)  
 
Many researchers have developed new ‘hybrid’ network topologies which incorporate various 
characteristics of one or more basic network structures identified above (Thadakamaila et al., 2004; 
Zhao et al., 2011(a); Kim et al., 2015). By adopting such a ‘complex network view’ of supply chains, 
these researchers have studied the resilience of supply networks from a network topological perspective.  
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2.2.1 Attachment Rules 
The variations to basic random and scale-free network models can be generated by various network 
growth models. A given network growth model governs the evolution of complex networks by 
specifying the way in which the new nodes connect with the existing ones in the network (Zhao et al., 
2011(a)). This process is referred to as ‘attachment’ and therefore the various network growth models 
comprise various ‘attachment rules’ which subsequently generate networks with distinctive topologies. 
By accounting for growth mechanisms, these network models are able to represent dynamical and open 
system characteristics of real life SCNs, where nodes enter and exit the network over time (Hearnshaw 
and Wilson, 2013). However, in contrast with the random and scale-free network models, the small-
world networks imply a fixed number of nodes and therefore cannot be used to model network growth. 
Small-world networks are of limited use when growth is involved in the network (typically the case in 
real world supply networks).  
For example, in random networks, the evolution is governed by a random attachment model, in which 
pairs of nodes are randomly connected with each other at a pre-defined probability level (Erdȍs and 
Rényi, 1959). In contrast, scale-free networks evolve through a preferential attachment model which 
stipulates that the probability of attaching a new node to an existing node which is directly proportional 
to the degree (the number of connections) of the existing node (Barabási and Albert, 1999).  
The preferential attachment model, in principle, represents the ‘rich get richer’ concept and therefore 
the resulting scale-free network topology can be used to model many real world networks, such as the 
World Wide Web, power grids, metabolic networks and social networks (Surana et al., 2005). This 
concept explains the existence of ‘hubs’ (a few nodes with a large number of connections), which is a 
unique feature within scale-free networks (Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003). 
 
2.2.2 Network Resilience Metrics 
 
Each of the complex network topologies discussed above comprise various resilience against failures 
levels1. Network failures can be categorised either as ‘random failures’ or ‘targeted attacks’. Random 
failures entail the same probability of failure across each node within a given network. By contrast, in 
a ‘targeted attack’ high degree nodes are compromised with a higher probability (Ruj and Pal, 2014). 
It has, so far, been established that the random networks respond similarly to both random failures and 
targeted attacks. In comparison, the scale-free networks are resilient against random failures but are 
highly sensitive to targeted attacks. This is due to the presence of hubs (most connected nodes) in scale-
free networks, which are usually the nodes targeted by an attacker.  
As per the above, random and scale-free network topologies represent two characteristically distinct 
network structures which operate in unique ways under random failures and targeted attacks. A number 
of researchers have modelled the operations of various SCN topologies under both random failures and 
targeted attacks, and attempted to establish an optimal topology which can withstand each type of failure, 
without compromising the overall network functionality.  
                                                            
1 The term ‘failure’ is used to identify the removal of nodes and/or links within a network. An important distinction between ‘failure’ and 
‘disruption’ is that under a disruption, the affected node or link could continue to operate, even partly.  
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Each research study has established a set of resilience metrics, in order to assess and compare the 
resilience of each network topology simulated under random failures and targeted attacks. These 
resilience (or ‘robustness’, as used by some researchers) metrics are variations of the existing standard 
topological metrics from graph theory. Some of the most common network topology metrics are 
outlined in Table 3 below. Costa et al. (2007) and Rubinov and Sporns (2010) provide a comprehensive 
range of measurements used for characterization of complex networks.  
 
 
Table 3: Common network topology metrics (Zhao et al., 2011(b)) 
Topology level metric Description of the metric 
Characteristic path length. The average of the shortest path length between any two nodes. 
Size of the largest connected 
component of a network. 
The number of nodes in the largest connected component of a network.  
Average path length in the largest 
connected component. 
The average of the shortest path length between any two nodes in the largest 
connected component of a network. 
Maximum path length in the largest 
connected component. 
The maximum path length between any two nodes in the largest connected 
component of a network.  
  
The above metrics consider the roles of separate entities (nodes and links), within a distribution 
network, to be homogeneous. Such an assumption would be far-fetched, since the entities within a 
real-life supply network play different roles with different characteristics – for example, the distance 
between two supply nodes or two demand nodes are not as important as that between a supply and a 
demand node (Zhao et al., 2011(b)).  
Therefore, the researchers (such as Thadakamaila et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 2011(a) and Zhao et al., 
2011(b)) in the field have developed new metrics which realistically represent the heterogeneous roles 
of entities within the supply network. These metrics include variations to one or more of the basic 
network topology metrics, by adding a flavour of supply availability, connectivity and accessibility.  
Table 4 summarises published work in this area, considering various supply network topologies and 
their resilience measured by various metrics.  
 
Table 4: Supply network topologies and resilience metrics 
Reference Work Undertaken Supply Network Structures 
Considered 
Resilience Metrics Used 
Kim et al. 
(2015) 
This differentiates between node/arc 
level and network level disruptions. 
Four basic supply network 
structures are compared to obtain 
results for resilience under 
disruptions. 
Four network structures are 
analysed; (1) Block-diagonal, 
(2) Scale-free, (3) Centralized 
and (4) Diagonal 
Resilience definition proposed 
by the authors (See Table 1) is 
used as a single metric. 
Thadakamaila 
et al (2004) 
Four survivability components are 
assessed for three different network 
topologies; (1) Robustness, (2) 
Responsiveness, (3) Flexibility and 
(4) Adaptivity. Four proxy metrics 
are used to represent each of the 
above components. 
Three complex network 
models are simulated and their 
survivability components 
compared by simulating 
removal of nodes from the 
network. The 3 models differ 
in their topology due to 
different underlying growth 
mechanisms; (1) Random 
Network (random attachment), 
(2) Scale Free Network 
(preferential attachment, (3) 
Characteristic path length, 
Clustering, Robustness to 
random and targeted failure 
and Efficient rewiring. 
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Proposed Network Model with 
new attachment rules 
specified. 
Qiang et al 
(2009) 
A new SCN model is developed 
with multiple decision makers 
associated at different tiers and with 
multiple transportation modes for 
shipment of the goods between tiers. 
Furthermore, a weighted supply 
chain performance and robustness 
measure is proposed - these are 
demonstrated through a numerical 
example. 
A novel SCN model is 
proposed to account for 
demand-side as well as the 
supply-side risks, with the 
demand being random and the 
supply-side risks modelled as 
uncertain parameters in the 
underlying cost functions. 
A weighted supply chain (SC) 
performance measure is 
proposed. The robustness 
measure is represented by the 
difference between the base 
SC performance and the SC 
performance measure at some 
pre-specified uncertainty 
level.  
Zhao et al 
(2011(a))  
New network resilience metrics that 
reflect heterogeneous roles of nodes 
in supply networks are used in a real 
life military logistic network. A 
hybrid and tunable network growth 
model called Degree and Locality-
based Attachment (DLA) is 
proposed. Computer simulations are 
undertaken to compare resilience of 
several supply network topologies, 
which were developed by using 
different growth models. 
Four networks are analysed; 
(1) Random (with random 
attachment), (2) Scale free 
(with preferential attachment), 
(3) Hierarchy + (with 
connections of nodes at same 
level in the hierarchy) and (4) 
DLA (with degree and locality 
based attachment). 
Availability (supply 
availability rate), Connectivity 
(size of the largest functional 
sub-network (LFSN)), 
Accessibility (average supply 
path length in the LFSN, max 
supply path length in the 
LFSN). 
Nair and 
Vidal (2011) 
Examines the robustness of 
individual network topologies by 
undertaking paired sample t-test for 
each network topology considered. 
The performance of a network in the 
absence of both random failures and 
targeted attacks is used as the base 
case. The performance of 20 
network topologies considered in 
the presence of varying degrees of 
random and targeted disruptions are 
compared with base case. 
Scale-free and random 
network topologies are 
considered. 
Robustness is represented by; 
(1) average path length, (2) 
clustering coefficient, (3) size 
of the largest connected 
component, (4) maximum 
distance between nodes in the 
largest connected component. 
Zhao et al 
(2011a) 
 
The robustness of heterogeneous 
distribution against random and 
targeted supply disruptions are 
studied. Both system level and 
corresponding topology level 
robustness metrics are proposed. 
This taxonomy consists of system 
level metrics which include supply 
availability, network connectivity 
and delivery efficiency and 
corresponding topology level 
metrics. Also, a new RLR 
(randomized local rewiring) 
approach based on probabilistic and 
localized rewiring of a distribution 
network is proposed with various 
rewiring probabilities.   
Scale-free and random 
network topologies are 
considered. Additional 
analysis is undertaken on 
small-world networks. 
Comparison is undertaken for 
each of these networks against 
the performance of a RLR 
(randomized local rewiring) 
network. 
New resilience metrics are 
proposed to distinguish the 
heterogeneous roles of the 
nodes in the systems. These 
metrics include, supply 
availability rate, size of the 
largest functional sub-
network, inverse of average 
minimum supply path length 
across all demand nodes and 
the adjusted average inverse 
supply path length across all 
(supply and demand) path 
pairs. 
Mari et al. 
(2014) 
A resilience model is developed for 
a complex SCN. This model is 
compared against the performance 
of other major complex networks 
using agent-based simulation.  
Random, small-world, scale 
free and HK-scale free 
networks are investigated.  
Resilience is represented by; 
(1) clustering coefficient, (2) 
supply availability rate, (3) 
size of the largest functional 
SCN and (4) average supply 
path length in the largest 
functional SCN.  
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The performance and resilience of various supply chains can be assessed and compared against each 
other by combining the resilience metrics considered into a single objective function (with the aim of 
optimising this function). However, most studies have investigated the effects of disruptions on the 
performance measured by individual resilience metrics.  
3. Discussion of reviewed literature  
 
From the literature presented above, the importance of defining the concept of resilience, in the context 
of supply chains, is evident. The definition of ‘resilience’ should be established in parallel with the 
definition of ‘disruption’. Another important distinction should be noted between the concepts of failure 
and disruption – the former represents a fully compromised node or a link with no capacity while the 
latter represents a scenario where the affected node or the link can operate, at least partially. 
Furthermore, depending on the structure of the overall supply network, disruptions can be experienced 
in various forms, such as; supply disruptions, logistics disruptions, coordination disruptions and demand 
disruptions (Yi et al., 2013). These various disruptions can be attributed to either nodes or links or both, 
for modelling purposes.  
Figure 3 illustrates the general methodology used by researchers to simulate random and targeted disruption to 
supply networks in order to assess and compare the resilience of various topologies (Thadakamaila et al., 2004; 
Zhao et al., 201(a); Zhao et al., 2011(b); Kim et al., 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 Establish network 
structures for 
comparison purposes. 
2.0 Introduce 
resilience metrics to 
evaluate. 
3.0 Develop a 
unique/hybrid growth 
model for study. A 
rewiring strategy can 
also be introduced for 
the supply network.  
4.0 Simulate random 
and targeted 
disruptions separately. 
5.0 Compare the 
performance of each 
network structure in 
light of each resilience 
metric considered. 
Comments: Scale-free, small-world, random, and other. 
Comments: Availability, connectivity and accessibility 
factors are considered. 
Comments: Degree and Locality based Attachment 
(DLA) rule by Zhao et al. (2011), Hierarchy +/Ad-
Hoc attachment rules are proposed in Thadakamaila et 
al. (2004). Randomised local rewiring (RLR) is 
introduced by Zhao et al. (2011). 
Comments: By removal of nodes and their associated 
links from the network – random disruptions are 
simulated by random node removal while targeted 
attacks are simulated by removal of high degree nodes 
(hubs).  
Comments: Resilience of each network structure can 
be evaluated based on resilience metric values during 
random and targeted disruptions. 
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Figure 3: General simulation methodology  
Various metrics are proposed by researchers to assess the supply chain resilience. For example, Kim et al (2015) 
derive a single metric for assessing supply network resilience, although this metric fails to account for different 
node and link level capabilities. Zhao et al (2011(a)) introduce a number of metrics which recognise the fact that 
nodes within a given network play heterogeneous roles. These metrics include availability, connectivity and 
accessibility characteristics of each network structure considered. Although it is possible to combine all the 
resilience metrics to a single objective function in order to optimise it, the focus is on investigating each 
component, which contributes to supply network resilience, separately. Whilst this approach provides a better 
understanding of supply network’s performance, under disruptions, from different perspectives (Zhao et al., 
2011(a)), a single resilience metric would enable convenient comparisons to be undertaken between the resiliency 
of various network structures. However, such an approach will require the allocation of weights to each aspect of 
resilience based on their respective importance as determined by the application (for example, in a military 
logistics system, more importance will be placed on supply availability than on connectivity).  
In relation to the growth mechanisms adopted to generate scale-free networks, the rich-gets-richer concept 
reflected within the mechanism of preferential attachment represents the competitive advantage (also known as 
the first mover advantage) of the first firm to establish itself within the supply network (by forming exchange 
relationships), compared to the late entrants. The above mechanism, however, inaccurately assumes that all firms 
within the supply network are homogeneous in nature with no differentiation (Hearnshaw and Wilson, 2013). In 
addition, the key requirement of the preferential attachment rule is that every new node joining the network must 
possess complete and up-to-date information about the degrees of every other existing node in the network. Such 
information, is unlikely to be readily available in a real world setting – for example, when considering a 
manufacturer for a new partnership, information about the overall reputation of that supplier may be more 
accessible than the number of their current suppliers and clients (Smolyarenko, 2014). Furthermore, as Newman 
(2003) stipulates, the Barabasi Albert (BA) model is a model of an undirected network – whereas the real life 
SCNs would include directed relationships (e.g.: delivery of physical goods).  
Although the growth of random networks is driven by a random attachment model, in reality supply network 
formation (connection of nodes with others) is governed by a set of objectives which are far from random. In 
addition, the static network structure (with no growth model due to the fixed number of nodes) offered by small-
world networks, in combination with the topology, which represents locally clustered nodes connected by a few 
long-distance arcs, do not typically represent real world supply networks. Consideration of such networks, which 
are rarely found in practice, is not suitable for deriving managerial implications for real supply networks. It is also 
possible for a supply network to comprise of various topologies representing different aspects of the overall 
operations – for example, the transportation network maybe grid-like while the communication network is scale-
free.  
The most common application of the complex network theory to real supply chains entails seeking improvements 
to resilience of the supply network. Therefore, these supply systems represent existing networks, to which 
improvements are sought – in terms of substituting a new node (or a link) to a failed or a disrupted one within the 
network. However, it should be realised that the supply networks, for which the resilience testing is sought, already 
possess a unique structure that may have evolved over time based on a non-generalizable growth model. Despite 
the large amount of published research in the field of supply chain resilience within the past few years, there is 
limited empirical validation of the conceptual findings, particularly in the arena of complex network modelling. 
 
In this paper, we argue that the attachment rule (or the growth model) of the supply network should consist of a 
weighted attribute mechanism whereby each organisation (i.e. an existing supply network) can select a new node 
to attach to, based on its characteristics. These characteristics could include quantitative aspects (such as: 
labour/product costs, distance etc - which can be consolidated into a single generalised cost function) and 
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qualitative aspects (such as: reliability, relationship, reputation, etc). This concept is discussed further in the next 
section.  
In addition to the above, literature also varies in terms of level of analysis; from individual firm level to a single 
supply chain level to the overall supply network level (Kim et al., 2015). Therefore, it is important to recognise 
that the findings from a study undertaken at the supply network level may not necessarily be applicable for a 
scenario involving an individual firm and/or a single supply chain. Distinguishing the level of analysis of a given 
study allows practitioners to generalize valuable research findings at a particular level to which the findings are 
applicable.  
4. Future research avenues 
 
The rapidly increasing complexity of global supply chains has resulted in a recent shift towards decentralised 
systems capable of autonomous behaviour. These systems (referred to as ‘smart systems’) are able to make 
independent decisions about production, distribution and transportation (Scholz-Reiter and Freitag, 2007). 
Although this smart technology has the ability to streamline the supply chain operations, resulting in significant 
cost savings to the global companies, the algorithms required to manage these systems as a whole, have not been 
fully developed. Research work published by Vespignani (2010) and Wycisk et al. (2008) have noted that the use 
of smart systems, which optimise individual components of the overall system, can aggravate the vulnerability of 
modern supply chains to perturbations in the volatile and turbulent global markets. Therefore, trade-offs between 
different variables within the entire system must be considered to achieve the optimal solution for a given supply 
network. As such, a holistic view of the overall supply network must be adopted, in the future, so that a system 
optimal solution, in terms of resilience, can be achieved. In this regard, the use of complex network theory to 
model real world supply networks is justified.  
 
It is evident from the contemporary research work reviewed and presented in this paper that complex network 
theory can be effectively utilised to create an abstraction of the real SCNs by representing individual entities 
within the supply network (such as suppliers, manufacturers, distributers, retailers, etc) as nodes and the 
relationships between them (deliveries, financial transactions, information flows, contracts, etc) as links.  
Table 5 illustrates the main findings and proposed future work from the key papers reviewed. 
Table 5: References/Findings/Future research proposed 
Reference Main Findings Future Work Proposed 
Kim et al. 
(2015)  
In terms of resilience, it was found that Scale 
free>Centralized>Diagonal>Block-diagonal. The 
network-level metrics of betweenness centrality and 
centralization were found not correlating with 
resilience. The proposed approach clearly 
differentiates a node/arc disruption from a network 
disruption. Also, it was found that redundancy may not 
always lead to higher resilience. 
All nodes and arcs having same probability of 
failure could be improved to reflect variable 
probabilities assigned arcs/nodes depending on 
their importance within the network. Functional 
and operational characteristics of arcs/nodes 
could be incorporated into the model. Also, 
partial functioning of nodes and links and 
potential rewiring mechanisms could be 
explored. 
Thadakamail
a et al. 
(2004) 
For random attacks, the proposed network model is 
almost equal in robustness to scale free networks > 
random networks. For targeted attacks, the size of the 
largest connected component decreases much faster 
for the proposed network than other two. However, the 
proposed network performs better on the other two 
robustness measures. 
Modification of the growth mechanisms to 
represent more realistic scenarios. The 
adaptivity of the network relates more to node 
functionality than to topology - the node 
functionality should facilitate the ability to 
rewire. 
Qiang et al. 
(2009) 
A new SC network model is developed with multiple 
decision makers associated at different tiers and with 
multiple transportation modes for shipment of the 
goods between tiers. Furthermore, a weighted supply 
chain performance and robustness measure is 
Should consider more comprehensive metrics to 
evaluate the SC network performance and 
empirical applications should be undertaken for 
SCs within various industries. 
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proposed - these are demonstrated through a numerical 
example. 
Zhao et al. 
(2011(a))  
A hybrid and tunable network growth model called 
Degree and Locality-based Attachment (DLA) is 
proposed. DLA was found to offer a good compromise 
strategy under both random and targeted failures. The 
impact of locality on resilience was found to be weaker 
than the impact of degree. Resilience against random 
failures: Hierarchy+>Scale-Free>DLA>Random, 
Resilience against targeted failures: 
Random>DLA>Scale-Free>Hierarchy+ 
Only node failures simulated - must consider 
link failures. Operational details such as flow of 
good, capacity limits on various links and nodes 
have not been incorporated. 
Nair and 
Vidal (2007) 
Examined the robustness of individual network 
topologies by undertaking paired sample t-test for each 
network topology considered. Long average path 
lengths between nodes were found to be detrimental to 
the network's robustness against disruptions. Shorter 
average distances between nodes in the network allow 
faster propagation of products/info thus aid in 
enhancing the responsiveness of the supply network in 
the event of disruption. 
The supply network robustness should be 
evaluated from multiple outcome metrics. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider various 
performance metrics such as inventories, 
backorders, total costs for a better 
understanding about network robustness. 
Zhao et al. 
(2011(b))  
The robustness of heterogeneous distribution against 
random and targeted supply disruptions are studied. A 
new RLR approach based on probabilistic and 
localized rewiring of a distribution network is 
proposed with various rewiring probabilities.  The 
proposed RLR approach with various rewiring 
probabilities indicate reasonable robustness properties 
under both random and targeted disruptions. Real life 
application to a military logistic networks with scale 
free and small world topologies and a retailer's 
distribution network in California, indicate that 
rewired distribution networks generally have stable 
robustness against both types of disruptions. 
(1) The simulation has only considered removal 
of nodes - should focus on removal of links also, 
(2) The robustness analysis is only presented at 
topological level, for real world applications, 
the operational level factors and constraints 
must be considered, such as the capacities of 
supply nodes, the needs of demand nodes, and 
the cost of transportation. (3) Effect of adaptive 
behaviours, such as increased capacity and new 
delivery routes, on the distribution network 
robustness in disruptions can be studied. (4) 
Could incorporate more heterogeneous roles in 
order to improve the real life validity of the 
findings. 
 
From the findings and future research proposals noted in the literature reviewed, as summarised in Table 5, it is 
evident that most of the previous research work undertaken in the field of modelling supply chains as complex 
adaptive systems have given primary consideration to network topology aspects. However, it must be noted that 
in addition to the network topology, the properties of individual constituents and the nature of their interactions 
also play a major role in characterizing the resilience of the overall supply network.  
Within the past decade, a significant amount of effort is devoted to the study of measurement of node degree 
distributions, formulation of theories to describe the underlying growth mechanisms, effects of degree distribution 
and growth mechanisms on network resilience (by simulating addition and/or removal of nodes and links) and 
other related phenomena. Such investigations indeed further our understanding of the effects of network topology 
on supply chain resilience. However, such an approach is considered more suitable for a ‘naturally occurring’ 
networks, whose structure evolves under an autonomous mechanism (endogenous to the system). Several 
examples of such systems include the internet, World Wide Web and social networks (Ghoshal, 2009). The 
evolution of the aforementioned systems are distributed in nature, with no intervention by a central authority.  
In contrast, the evolution of a supply network is dependent on the interests of the overall organisation controlling 
the operations (e.g, the supply chain of Coca Cola would represent interests and priorities of this organisation). 
Furthermore, the nodes in supply networks, include various attributes (such as capacity, cost, qualitative features, 
etc). As such, important insights to supply network operations and resilience can be obtained by including the 
above operational aspects of nodes within the network model.  
In addition, the links in the network which represent exchange relationships between individual entities also 
include important features. Hitherto, the focus of modelling is on unweighted and, for the most part, undirected 
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complex networks (where links between nodes are either present or not, as a binary variable). However, many 
real world networks exhibit large heterogeneity in the capacity and intensity of the connections (links) between 
the nodes. Rui and Ban (2012) state that empirical observations have illustrated the existence of nontrivial 
correlations and associations between link weights and topological quantities in complex networks. In the context 
of supply networks for example, the connection, be it a physical flow or a relationship, between one organisation 
and others are deemed to have variability in terms or the strength and importance (some exchange relationships 
may be more important compared to the others).  
Therefore, the supply network can be better reflected and understood in terms of weighted networks, so that the 
heterogeneity in capacity and intensity in various connections are captured accurately in the model. This weighting 
of links can be a function of volume, frequency and criticality of flows in a given period (Hearnshaw and Wilson, 
2013). The final network will include links which carry a numerical value representing the strength of the 
connection between the two nodes at each end (Boccaletti et al., 2006). A summary of complex network measures 
for weighted and directed networks is presented in Rubinov and Sporns (2010). 
It is therefore imperative to consider the above operational features in any modelling approach to obtain 
meaningful insights on the behaviour of real life supply networks. In following the above approach, the 
heterogeneity between the individual constituents of the overall supply network can be more realistically modelled. 
It should also be noted that the resilience metrics will also need to be updated in light of the incorporated node/link 
operational characteristics. Cox et al., (2011) define categories specific to static and dynamic resilience metrics in 
the context of transportation system operation (as opposed to the network topology). Some of these metrics 
include; conservation of service, input substitution, inventories, excess capacity and relocation. An assessment 
undertaken against the above set of metrics will accurately represent the resilience of a given supply network in 
light of both topology and operations. 
  
Most real world supply networks include a fixed number of firms (systems which do not continuously grow). 
However, modelling fixed number of firms is difficult since the static models do not exhibit a power law 
connectivity distribution (Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003). In this regard, some promising research work is 
undertaken in the recent years, to overcome the difficulty of generate scale-free networks topologies for networks 
with a fixed number of nodes, by means of either continuously adding links to represent new exchange 
relationships (Paperin et al., 2008) or through continuous rewiring of existing exchange relationships (Xie et al., 
2008). The implication of the connection dynamics above translates to real world events as follows; 
1) The continuous addition of links can be described as the ongoing relationships, at various time periods, 
between different firms within the overall system (a manufacturer for example can have more than a 
single supplier); and 
2) The continuous rewiring of existing links can be described as the ongoing exchange behaviour where 
firms within the supply network rotate contracts among the available pool (for example, supplier 
contracts tend to be rotated among various suppliers over time such as periodic retendering of supply 
contracts). 
 
Hearnshaw and Wilson (2011) note the following limitations in using the ‘preferential attachment’ growth 
mechanism presented in the BA model for modelling real world supply networks; 
1) The network growth, while imperative to model real world supply networks, may not necessarily be 
applicable for the majority of the cases where supply chains do not continuously grow – i.e. most supply 
chain systems are likely to include a relatively fixed number of firms over extended periods of time; 
2) The preferential attachment assumes that acquisition of new exchange relationships by a given firm is 
determined solely by the number of its existing exchange relationships. This assumption implies that the 
number of exchange relationships for a given firm is a function of their duration within that supply 
network. Li (2009) has presented significant exception to the above idea using Google as an example – 
despite being a late entrant, Google has managed to dominate the search engines for the World Wide 
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Web by establishing much more exchange relationships. As such, a need exists to represent the ‘fitness’ 
of the firm to explain behaviour where new entrants dominate the supply chain within a relatively short 
period of time, such as Google.  
3) Growth by preferential attachment produces a decaying clustering coefficient as the network expands. 
This may not a realistic representation of exchange relationships in real supply networks.  
 
As such, the preferential growth mechanism requires several modifications to account for modelling of the real 
supply chains. Ghadge et al. (2010) develop a lognormal fitness attachment model which accounts for the various 
factors that contribute to the likelihood of a new node being attracted to an existing node within a network. In the 
BA model, the attachment probability is based on the degree of the existing node (number of existing connections), 
and within the context of supply networks, this is a proxy for the existing impact that particular entity (organisation) 
has on the overall industry. However, within the supply network context, when deciding to connect to a new node, 
various attributes of this node will certainly be considered (be it the cost, reliability, efficiency, reputation, etc). 
As such, an attachment rule, which considers the node ‘fitness’ is deemed more relevant for modelling real life 
supply networks.  
In the model proposed by Ghadge et al. (2010), the fitness Φi which represents the propensity of node i to attract 
links is formed multiplicatively from a number of attributes {Φ1, Φ2,…., ΦL} as follows; 
 
Where each attribute, Φl is represented as a real non-negative value. Subsequently, it is assumed that the number 
of attributes affecting a node’s attractiveness is sufficiently large and are statistically independent. Therefore, the 
overall fitness Φi will be lognormally distributed, regardless of the type of distribution of individual factors 
(Nguyen and Tran, 2012).   
The fitness based attachment procedure proposed by Ghadge et al. (2010) is as follows; 
1) Start with the initial network of n0 nodes, each assigned a random fitness according to the lognormal 
distribution 
2) Each time a new node is added; stop after the nth node is added. 
a. Assign a random fitness to the new node according to the lognormal distribution. 
b. Add m edges linking the new node to m distinct existing nodes such that the probability πi for 
connecting to an existing node i is taken to be proportional to its fitness Φi.  
ෑൌ
௜
	 Φi∑ Φj௝  
 
The above attachment rule, named the ‘Lognormal Fitness Attachment’ (LNFA), is almost identical to the BA 
model – the key difference being that information on node fitness is substituted in place of node degree 
information. Based on the BA model, the degree of a new node at the time it joins the network is small, and 
therefore this node has to exist within the network for a long period of time before it may become a preferential 
choice for the future new nodes to attach to. In LNFA, a new node which has a large fitness, despite being in the 
network for a short period of time, can make itself a preferential choice for the other new nodes entering the 
network (Nguyen and Tran, 2012).  The above is a reasonable representation of real life network growth as 
attractiveness of a node may not result from the number of nodes it is connected to, rather it is the general ‘fitness’ 
of this node that is significant (see the Google example earlier in this section).  
The LNFA includes a tunable parameter Ϭ, which can be manipulated to generate a large range of real world 
networks. At one extreme, when Ϭ is zero, all nodes have the same fitness and therefore at the time a new node 
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joins the network, it chooses an existing node as a neighbour with equal probability – thus replicating the random 
graph model with an exponential degree distribution. On the other hand, when Ϭ is increased beyond a certain 
threshold, a very few nodes will contain very large level of fitness while an overwhelming majority of nodes 
include extremely low levels of fitness. As a result, the majority of new connections will be made to a single or a 
very few nodes which have high levels of fitness. The resulting network therefore resembles a 
monopolistic/”winner-take-all” scenario, which can also be observed in real world. Between the above two 
extremes (exponential and monopolistic) lies a spectrum of power-law networks which can closely represent the 
operations of real world complex networks.  
 
Finally, it is to be noted that the attachment mechanism derived shall indeed be domain specific (Thadakamaila 
et al., 2004) – i.e. the attachment rule should closely represent the properties and key considerations of the supply 
network under scrutiny. Also, the attachment rules should be specified at node level rather than at the network 
level (i.e. the attachment rule varies based on the type of the node that enters the system, for example the fitness 
criteria for a supplier maybe different to that of a manufacturer, etc).  
4.1 Proposed Considerations 
The following table summarises the methodological improvements, as identified in the above section, in modelling 
a supply network as a complex adaptive network. This improved approach relies on past research work undertaken 
in the area of topological analysis and attempts to create a model that produces a realistic representation of supply 
networks by accounting for a number of major factors that play a vital role in the formation of real supply networks. 
The key questions posed in this respect are summarised in Table 6.  
Table 6: Key issues and proposed considerations 
Key Question Considerations Potential Solutions 
How to incorporate 
individual 
components within a 
SCN in to the 
model? 
Spatially stable entities as nodes and 
exchange processes (information, goods, 
services, relationships, etc) as links.  
 
Heterogeneity of each component (nodes 
and links) should be incorporated. 
Create a pool of nodes (suppliers, manufacturer, 
distributors, retailers, etc) with various attributes 
to reflect heterogeneity. These attributes could be 
in the form of Boolean (one of two states), 
discrete or continuous variables (such as capacity, 
demand, flows, costs, behaviour, etc). Complete 
the network using directed and weighted links 
based on the nature and intensity of the 
relationship between the two nodes it connects.  
 
What is the most 
appropriate growth 
model that should be 
adopted to model an 
evolving complex 
SCN? 
Consideration should be given to the unique 
characteristics of each node entering the 
system (variable propensity of attraction).   
 
Domain specific attachment probabilities 
should be used. 
Customised probabilistic attachment rules can be 
developed based on key considerations (domain 
specific).  
Node fitness should be a key indicator of 
attachment probability as opposed to the node 
degree. 
The type of attachment mechanism should depend 
on the type of the node that enters the system. 
How to model risks 
in SCNs? 
Functionality of the nodes and links should 
be considered. Previous research papers 
have simulated disruptions by removal of 
nodes and/or links within the SCN. Such a 
scenario, translates into a loss of 
functionality of either a node and/or a link 
within the SCN, e.g.: a warehouse at a 
distribution centre being affected due to a 
fire. However, a more realistic simulation of 
this situation would be to incorporate partial 
functionality of the affected link or the node. 
Within the context of the previous example, 
this partial functioning relates to the 
An important distinction must be made between 
the full loss (failure) or partial loss of 
functionality (disruption) of nodes and/or links 
within the SCN, in simulation procedures, in 
order to more realistically represent the SCN 
functions under disruptions.  
 
The spatially embedded networks, which are 
similar to most supply networks, exhibit different 
resilience properties since spatial failure could 
potentially affect clusters of nodes and/or links. 
Such considerations could be incorporated within 
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warehouse, being able to function after the 
fire, at least in part. 
the simulation model by generating network 
overlays (to indicate network interdependencies). 
What criteria should 
be used to assess the 
resilience of a SCN? 
Similar to the network topological studies, 
develop relevant operational metrics to 
optimise. Given the focus of the study is to 
improve the resilience of supply chains, 
these operational metrics will correspond to 
resilience of the overall system. 
Initial studies will evaluate the performance of the 
overall system, when links and/or nodes are 
randomly removed and when vital links and/or 
nodes are intentionally removed, in light of the 
metrics established in the above step. 
How to develop a 
rewiring mechanism 
for an existing SCN? 
Previous research work has considered full 
removal of a given link and/or a node. 
However, a more realistic representation can 
be obtained by modelling partial 
functionality of these network elements. 
Rewiring mechanism can be developed by 
accounting for the partial functionality of nodes 
and/or links. This will allow comparison of 
rewiring costs against the costs incurred due to the 
loss of service (full or partial).  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has presented a comprehensive and critical review of the previous research work undertaken in the 
arena of complex adaptive systems modelling of supply chain network resilience. Although the complex network 
theory offers a rich conceptual representation of the supply network principles, a number of potential 
improvements to the existing modelling approach are identified and are proposed as future research avenues. 
Furthermore, clarification is provided for the concept of ‘resilience’, which is to be used in parallel with the 
concept of ‘disruption’.  
The next phase of this work entails the incorporation of the proposed methodological improvements in a 
simulation model to obtain the findings on supply network resiliency. This model can then be tested empirically 
for on a supply network within a specific domain.  
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